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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
 
 
 
iv
 
Abstract 
 
In 1998 the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) introduced a new regulatory model 
into the organisation to improve their long-term compliance enforcement strategies. Many 
tax authorities around the world have expressed interest in the ATO Compliance Model 
and some (for example, UK, New Zealand) have since introduced similar models into their 
organisations. The ATO Compliance Model was designed using the concept of responsive 
regulation—a concept developed by scholars working in other fields of regulation. This 
paper aims to provide the reader with a background to understanding the theoretical 
concepts underlying the Model, and also discusses how and why the Tax Office came to 
develop the model. Using interview data collected from senior Tax Office executives, this 
paper will also present some success stories the Tax Office has had with the Model in 
changing taxpayer attitudes and behaviours.  
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Moving towards a more effective model of regulatory enforcement in the Australian 
Taxation Office 
 
Kristina Murphy 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1998 a pyramidal model of responsive regulation was introduced into the Australian Tax 
Office (Tax Office) as a means to improving its management of taxpayer compliance 
(Cash Economy Task Force Report, 1998). In developing this model, the Tax Office 
incorporated regulatory theory that had been developed by regulatory scholars working in 
other fields of regulation (such as mining regulation, and environmental regulation; see 
Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), as well as psychological theories that had been developed in 
the study of nursing home regulation (Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson 
& Makkai, 1994). Five years on, the ATO Compliance Model is being used routinely by 
Tax Office staff to help them develop more effective compliance strategies.  
 
Since being introduced into the Tax Office in 1998, several other tax authorities around the 
world are beginning to recognise the value of the ATO Compliance Model. For example, 
the OECD has expressed interest in the model and both the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand have since taken the ATO Compliance Model and developed similar models that 
suit their local contexts (Hamilton, 2003; New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2001; UK Inland 
Revenue, 2001). The Pennsylvania State Revenue Department in the United States has also 
recently expressed interest in the Model and has begun conducting research, in 
collaboration with the University of Pennsylvania, to test the effectiveness of some of the 
principles outlined in the Model.  
 
The aim of the present paper will be to first provide the reader with some background 
information about the regulatory principles that underpin the ATO Compliance Model 
(these principles also underlie the UK and New Zealand Models). It will then move on to 
discuss why and how the Tax Office came to develop their model, and it will also discuss 
some of the success stories that the Tax Office has had with the Compliance Model in 
improving attitudes and compliance among taxpayers. 
 
 2
An overview of regulatory theory 
 
A debate in the regulatory literature has been between those who think that individuals and 
firms will comply with rules and regulations only when confronted with harsh sanctions 
and penalties, and those who believe that gentle persuasion and cooperation works in 
securing compliance with the law (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). These two alternate 
approaches to regulation have been termed the ‘deterrence’ and ‘accommodative’ models 
of regulation. As will be discussed in later sections, a responsive model of regulation 
combines the best of both approaches into a single enforcement pyramid. 
 
For those advocating a purely deterrence view, individuals and firms are seen to be 
‘rational actors’ who are motivated entirely by profit seeking. They carefully assess 
opportunities and risks, and disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of 
being caught are small in relation to the profits to be made through non-compliance (for a 
discussion see Kagan & Scholz, 1984). Advocates of this view therefore believe that harsh 
sanctions and penalties should be used to ensure compliance. Throughout the 1970s the 
majority of regulatory agencies around the world adopted such a deterrence model of 
regulatory enforcement. Regulatory officers were more likely to respond to detected 
shortcomings by immediately issuing notices of violation and issuing fines and as a result 
were seen to be harsh and insensitive (Kagan, 1989).  
 
The deterrence model of enforcement has been criticised on a number of dimensions. One 
criticism has been that it does not satisfactorily explain the high levels of voluntary 
compliance observed in many situations. If people were simply rational actors motivated 
purely by self-interest, one would expect that compliance with rules and regulations would 
be significantly lower than what has currently been observed. Take, for example, the issue 
of tax compliance in Australia. The tax system in Australia is based largely on self-
assessment and voluntary compliance by taxpayers. The probability of receiving an audit 
from the Tax Office is low. The chance of being caught avoiding tax is also, on the balance 
of probabilities, unlikely, and if a taxpayer is caught, the culpability penalties are relatively 
minor when compared to the potential for economic gain. Yet the majority of Australian 
taxpayers still comply with their obligations and pay their taxes with good will 
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(Braithwaite, 2003). This is much like the situation in countries such as the United 
Kingdom or the United States. Smith and Kinsey, for example, showed that the majority of 
American taxpayers were compliant even when the possibility of detection and punishment 
for non-compliance was obviously slim (Smith & Kinsey, 1987). Findings such as these 
are not unique to the field of tax compliance. For example, in a study of environmental 
compliance in the United Kingdom, researchers also found that the majority of regulated 
entities complied with regulatory requirements even though less than one percent of 
violators were prosecuted and fines were minimal (Hawkins, 1984). 
 
In the 1980s, therefore, many researchers began to question the value of deterrence in 
regulating behaviour. Regulatory scholars began to focus their attention on researching 
compliance rather than deterrence and began to realise the importance of persuasion and 
cooperation as a regulatory tool for gaining compliance. Many regulatory agencies 
followed suit by adopting accommodative models of regulation (Grabosky & Braithwaite, 
1986). Regulatory agencies advocating the accommodative model of regulatory 
enforcement tend to view business firms and individuals not as ‘rational actors’ but as 
‘social actors’ who are ordinarily inclined to comply with the law, partly because of belief 
in the rule of law, and partly as a matter of long-term self-interest (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). 
Regulatory agencies adopting the accommodative model tend to be more oriented toward 
seeking results through cooperation rather than by coercion, and prefer to see themselves 
as consultants rather than as strict law enforcers. These agencies are more likely to give 
second chances, they give advice about how to comply, and may agree to ignore one 
violation in return for a correction to another violation.  
 
The pros and cons of punishment and persuasion 
 
Both the deterrence and accommodative approaches to regulatory enforcement have their 
advantages. It should be noted, however, that each approach also has major disadvantages 
if regulators choose to adopt one exclusively over the other. For example, it has been 
shown that the problem of a mostly punitive policy is that it fosters resistance to regulation 
and may produce a culture that facilitates the sharing of knowledge about methods of legal 
resistance and counterattack (Bardach & Kagan, 1982). Kagan and Scholz (1984) further 
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suggested that unreasonable behaviour by regulators can also generate resistance to 
compliance. Unreasonableness may involve disrespect for citizens, or arbitrary refusal to 
take their concerns into account in the enforcement process. For example, when a taxpayer 
with good compliance records inadvertently violates tax laws because the rules are 
complex or ambiguous, they are likely to regard punishment by the tax authority as 
unreasonable and unfair. If regulators adopt a purely punitive method of regulating, 
whereby they assume that individuals are solely self-interested and motivated by money, 
this may be perceived as unreasonable and will dissipate the will of well-intentioned 
individuals to comply, leading to potential resistance to the law (for a case study 
demonstrating this effect in the Australian taxation context see Appendix). In addition to 
the negative psychological effect of deterrence, punishment is often very time consuming 
and therefore very expensive.  
 
Arguments usually put in favour of adopting an accommodative (or responsive) approach, 
are that it involves an efficient use of resources. In other words, persuasion is relatively 
inexpensive because persuasion will elicit a more cooperative approach from the regulatee, 
more information is likely to be forthcoming about their practices and possibly about areas 
of non-compliance, and it will engage the regulatee in decisions as to how best to act to 
secure compliance (Black, 2001). If persuasion works, both sides avoid expensive 
enforcement and litigation procedures and more resources will be left to expand regulatory 
coverage. In this situation, society also gains the benefits of improved compliance at low 
cost to the economy.  
 
While research on the effectiveness of the accommodative approach is only in its infancy, 
there is growing evidence to suggest that cooperation with regulated entities increases 
compliance. For example, support for a regulatory enforcement model based on 
cooperation and trust comes from examining the Tax Office’s recent approach with 42 000 
taxpayers who were accused of being involved in tax avoidance schemes (Murphy, in 
press; see also Appendix). After realising that their traditional deterrence approach for 
dealing with non-compliant taxpayers was not working (that is, more than 50% of 
taxpayers refused to pay back their taxes), the Tax Office decided to take on a more 
cooperative approach by first acknowledging that tax scheme investors had been the 
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victims of aggressive marketing and bad advice (thus, trust in investors’ honesty was 
brought to the foreground). Second, those that had been the victims of aggressive 
marketing and bad advice were given a concession on their scheme related tax debts. This 
concession came in the form of a settlement offer, whereby culpability penalties and 
interest on scheme related debts were abolished. After four years of active resistance, this 
strategy resulted in the Tax Office receiving a flood of settlement acceptances, with 87% 
of scheme investors finally agreeing to settle their debts with the Tax Office 
(Commissioner of Taxation, 2003). 
 
In another study of compliance with Australian nursing home care standards, Braithwaite 
and Makkai (1994) also found that an accommodative regulatory strategy in the first 
instance was more effective in gaining voluntary compliance. In this study, 410 nursing 
homes were inspected with the aim of determining whether or not they complied with 31 
nursing home standards. During an initial inspection, each nursing home was given a 
compliance rating against each of these 31 standards. Eighteen months later, a follow up 
inspection was conducted and the compliance score given at the second inspection was of 
interest. Braithwaite and Makkai found that if inspectors were initially seen to be treating 
nursing home managers with trust and cooperation, compliance was more likely to 
improve in the two years following the initial inspection. Scholz (1991) also found that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the United States could increase the 
effectiveness of their regulatory enforcement by administering less stringent sanctions and 
penalties (for similar findings see Feld & Frey, 2002; Fisse & Braithwaite, 1993; Frey, 
1997).  
 
It is acknowledged, however, that adopting a purely accommodative model of regulation, 
which basically views all individuals as good and honest, would be naïve. This regulatory 
style fails to recognise that there are individuals who are not so honest and who will take 
advantage of being presumed to be so. For example, one study conducted in Canada found 
that the same companies continued to violate health and safety regulations, despite being 
given lenient treatment (Brown, 1994). It was found that repeat violations accounted for 
31% of the approximately 200 000 violations recorded between 1984 and 1986. Yet, 
regulators seldom imposed penalties on employers with repeat violations. In another study, 
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Harrison (1995; cited in Shapiro & Rabinowitz, 1997) compared compliance rates between 
pulp and paper industries in Canada and the United States and found lower compliance 
rates in Canada. Harrison attributed this finding to the fact that Canadian enforcers tend to 
be more lenient than their American neighbours when addressing non-compliance.  
 
When considering all of these findings together, a regulatory enforcement strategy based 
solely on accommodation or a regulatory enforcement strategy based solely on deterrence 
is not the answer. The following section describes a new approach to regulation. This 
approach allows regulators to ‘speak softly, while carrying very big sticks’ (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992, p. 40); that is, to be legalistic in some cases but accommodative and 
helpful in others. In other words it is an approach that seeks to establish a synergy between 
deterrence and accommodation.  
 
Moving forward: Responsive regulation 
 
In his book To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of coal mine safety, John Braithwaite 
argued that sound regulatory enforcement could not be developed unless regulators 
understood the fact that sometimes those being regulated were motivated solely by making 
money and sometimes they were motivated by a sense of social responsibility (Braithwaite, 
1985; see also Kagan & Scholz, 1984). In other words, it is possible that a firm may be a 
responsible citizen and social actor today but a rational actor calculating costs and benefits 
next month. Braithwaite therefore rejected a regulatory strategy based totally on persuasion 
or a regulatory strategy based totally on punishment. Following on from this argument, in 
his 1992 book with Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite stated that the time had come to escape 
what he described as ‘a long history of barren disputation’ between those advocating 
accommodative and those advocating deterrent models of regulatory enforcement (see 
Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, Chapter 2). He proposed a convergence of the two approaches. 
This new theoretical approach to regulation is known most widely as responsive 
regulation, and it is now being recognised that regulatory agencies that do best at 
achieving their goals are those that strike some sort of sophisticated and dynamic balance 
between the deterrence and accommodative models of regulation.  
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The basic contention of Ayres and Braithwaite’s theory of responsive regulation is not 
whether to punish or persuade, but when to punish and when to persuade. Ayres and 
Braithwaite clearly envisaged the possibility of stylistic choices within an agency, as staff 
encounter differing motivations among industries and individuals. Ayres and Braithwaite 
further suggested that regulatory officers should be prepared to shift from strict regulators 
to educators and back again according to their analysis of a particular case (see also Black, 
2001; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). They also suggested that this flexibility in regulatory style 
could be adopted through the use of an enforcement pyramid of regulation. 
 
The regulatory pyramid 
 
One version of regulatory responsiveness involves the use of a hierarchy of graduated 
responses to non-compliance. John Braithwaite (1985) was the first to argue that 
compliance is most likely when an agency displays an explicit enforcement pyramid. 
According to Braithwaite, ‘defection from cooperation is likely to be a less attractive 
proposition for business when it faces a regulator with an enforcement pyramid than when 
confronted with a regulator having only one deterrence option’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1992, p. 36).  
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, an enforcement pyramid consists of a number of layers, each 
layer representing a different enforcement activity a regulator could use to gain compliance 
from a regulated firm. As one escalates up the pyramid in Figure 1, the regulatory strategy 
changes from persuasion at the bottom through sanctions of increasing severity to licence 
revocation at the top. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) suggest that a pyramid such as this 
should be used in conjunction with a ‘tit for tat’ strategy (see also Scholz, 1984a; 1984b). 
If the firm or individual being regulated is being cooperative, the regulator should respond 
in turn by being cooperative. If the regulated firm or individual is being uncooperative, the 
regulator should escalate up the pyramid through a range of compliance options that 
eventually lead to harsh sanctions. Thus, an enforcement pyramid such as this subjects 
regulatees to escalating forms of regulatory intervention if they continually refuse to 
respond to regulatory demands. Clear communication in advance that a regulator is willing 
to escalate their enforcement strategies up the pyramid in response to uncooperativeness 
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also gives incentives to those being regulated to comply with their demands. It is also 
important that regulators follow through with this enforcement action if it has been 
threatened, otherwise they may risk undermining the integrity of the system.  
 
 
Figure 1: Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid (source: Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992, p. 35) 
 
One might ask, however, where the starting point should be. Should a regulator always 
start at the bottom of the pyramid, or should they start somewhere in the middle? Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) argue that because of the disadvantages of a punishment approach 
(that is, expense, counterproductive, unworkable in the long term), regulators should 
always start their enforcement strategies softly by using cooperation and persuasion, and 
should only respond with sanctions and penalties when the regulated firm or individual 
continues to be non-compliant. The advantage of using a pyramid such as this is that its use 
is therefore not dependent on a correct diagnosis of the motives of the firm or individual 
being regulated. One does not have to predict in advance whether the individual or firm is 
motivated by money or morals. All one needs to do is look for cooperation in correcting 
the problem at hand.  
Persuasion
Warning Letter
Civil Penalty
Criminal Penalty
Licence 
suspension
Licence revocation
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Experienced tax auditors sometimes have a problem with the use of a cooperative first 
encounter. They argue that their case selection methods and their experience give them a 
reasonably arguable position that some tax mischief has occurred and that they should 
enter the regulatory encounter ready to sanction. The proponents of an enforcement 
pyramid would counter argue that a cooperative first step will allow the delinquent 
taxpayer the opportunity to change their behaviour and adopt a compliant position. If this 
does not occur, then a swift escalation to sanctions is required to ensure that both parties 
understand the serious consequences of non-compliance. The costs of a cooperative first 
step to both parties are low, it only takes minutes at the commencement of each interaction, 
and the potential gains are high for each party. 
 
So why should cooperation and persuasion be the strategy of first choice? Ayres and 
Braithwaite argue that when punishment rather than dialogue is in the foreground of a 
regulatory encounter, it is basic to human psychology that people will find this humiliating. 
Citizen response is likely to be weakened respect for compliance with the law. By keeping 
punishment in the background instead of the foreground of the encounter, the regulator is 
more likely to keep an individual’s law-abiding self to the fore.  
 
According to Ayres and Braithwaite, persuasion should be the strategy of first choice 
because preserving the perception of fairness is important to nurturing voluntary 
compliance (see also Murphy, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, in press; Tyler, 1990). While not 
having the space here to discuss this issue in detail, social theories that understand 
compliance from the perspective of institutional legitimacy and procedural fairness suggest 
that individuals and firms will regard tough enforcement action as more procedurally fair 
when persuasion has been tried first (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 
1988). Research has also found that people are most likely to challenge a situation 
collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair and that they personally 
suffered because of the injustice (Murphy, 2002, 2003b, in press; Tyler & Smith, 1998).  
 
This is not to say that there is no place for punishment. While Ayres and Braithwaite argue 
that persuasion should be the strategy of first choice, they also suggest that if a regulated 
firm or individual continues to be non-compliant, the regulatory authority should increase 
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the severity of the regulatory response accordingly. In fact, ‘regulators should always 
retain the capacity to apply tough sanctions, because a strategy based entirely on 
persuasion and self-regulation will be exploited when actors are motivated by economic 
rationality’ (Sparrow, 2000, p. 40). Part of the key to successful regulation is the need for 
regulators to maintain their reputation for toughness so that they will not be perceived as 
‘toothless tigers’. If regulatory agencies fail to punish rule breakers, others will start to 
question their own compliance. In her examination of tax enforcement, for example, Levi 
(1988) stresses that active prosecution of violators is crucial because perceptions of 
‘exploitation’ will encourage non-compliance in other taxpayers. The key to maintaining 
compliant behaviour in any area of policing, therefore, is for regulators to remain able and 
willing to devote resources to maintain their reputation for toughness. But again, regulators 
should not lose sight that this portrayal of toughness should also be balanced with a 
respectful and cooperative approach in the first instance.  
 
Finally, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that the greater the heights of tough 
enforcement to which an agency can escalate (at the apex of the enforcement pyramid), the 
more effective the agency will be at securing compliance and the less likely that it will 
have to resort to tough enforcement. ‘Regulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly 
when they are perceived as carrying big sticks’ (p. 6). 
 
For example, consider the enforcement pyramid presented in Figure 2a. Here, it can be 
seen that the heights to which the regulatory agency can escalate its enforcement strategies 
are rather limited. There are not enough options for dealing with different types of non-
compliers. In this situation, a regulator may have someone who has continuously violated 
regulations receiving the same sanction as someone who may have inadvertently violated a 
law for the first time. In the case of the pyramid in Figure 2b, however, the heights to 
which the regulatory agency can escalate its enforcement strategies are quite varied. In the 
case of the first time offender, a slap on the wrist might be considered more appropriate 
than revoking their operating license. In the case of the repeat offender, however, previous 
attempts to bring them into compliance have obviously failed and it would seem prudent in 
this situation—once the facts of their case have been determined—to take more serious 
action against them (because after all, they have been given several chances before). 
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Thus, the advantage of having a range of sanctions is that the regulator can pick and 
choose between a strategy they think is most appropriate given the circumstance. In 
addition, in the case of the enforcement pyramid in Figure 2b, the more punitive the 
sanction at the apex of the pyramid, the more likely an individual or firm will think the 
regulator is someone who should be listened to and cooperated with. 
 
 
 
  (a)       (b) 
 
Figure 2. Regulatory enforcement pyramids that (a) provide regulators with a limited 
range of regulatory responses and (b) provide regulators with a range of regulatory 
responses to choose from (taken and adapted from Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 41). 
 
 
Summary 
 
So in summary, responsive regulation is a mix between the accommodative and deterrence 
models of enforcement. It has been suggested that one way to use responsive regulation 
effectively is to use an enforcement pyramid whereby the regulator can start with 
persuasion and escalate up the pyramid, skipping levels if necessary, if cooperation is not 
forthcoming. Finally, the advantage of using an enforcement pyramid such as this is that it 
Persuasion
Warning 
Letter
Civil Penalty
Persuasion
Warning Letter
Civil Penalty
Criminal 
Penalty
Licence 
suspension
Licence revocation
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offers regulators a range of sanctions to choose from; it allows them to match the 
persuasive or sanctioning strategy to the level of observed non-compliance. 
 
Bringing responsive regulation to life: The ATO Compliance Model 
 
The advantages of adopting a model of responsive regulation have been increasingly 
recognised by many regulatory authorities. For example, in the late 1990s, the Tax Office 
realised that it should do more than just collect revenue. They recognised that a tax 
authority should also concern itself with building community confidence and partnerships 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of the tax system. A move away from the old style of 
command and control regulation was seen to be one way that this could be achieved. A 
pyramidal model of responsive regulation was therefore introduced into the Tax Office as a 
means to improving its long-term management of the tax system. Since this time, and after 
in-depth discussions with the Tax Office, a number of other tax administrations around the 
world have either introduced or are considering introducing similar models. The following 
sections will outline the moves made by the Tax Office to introduce its Compliance Model 
of regulation and will discuss some of the success stories that have been achieved as a 
direct result of the Compliance Model being utilised.  
 
Reasons why the Compliance Model was introduced 
 
As discussed in detail by Job and Honaker (2003), the Tax Office was facing a serious 
legitimacy crisis during the 1990s. Constant media reports about poor Tax Office practices, 
bully-boy tactics and accusations of excessive and unfair use of power were rife (Gumley 
& Wyatt, 1996). There were claims that the Tax Office was ‘out of touch’ and ‘lacked 
understanding’ (Anonymous, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c) and that poor use of penalties 
‘threatened the integrity of the tax system’ (Chamberlain, 1996). Criticism and demands 
for change therefore came from community and government alike.  
 
In response to political questioning and regulatory policy debate, the Tax Office adopted 
several measures intended to make it more open and sensitive to the concerns of taxpayers. 
These measures included the introduction of the Taxpayers’ Charter—a document that sets 
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principles and standards for the way the Tax Office conducts its dealings with taxpayers—
and perhaps more importantly the move away from the long-established style of command-
and-control enforcement to a program of responsive regulation (Hobson, 2003; Job & 
Honaker, 2003; Shover, Job & Carroll, 2003). This took the form of the ATO Compliance 
Model, which was publicly released for use in the Tax Office in 1998.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the Compliance Model, the Tax Office was quick to escalate 
their enforcement strategies as soon as problems arose. Little or no consideration was 
given to a taxpayer’s individual circumstances, and no thought was given to achieving 
future compliance. In an area such as taxation, the behaviour that is being regulated is 
continuous and fundamental to the long-term health of the community. In such a regulatory 
context, field officers must display patience and tolerance rather than legal authority, for 
the goal is not to punish but to secure long-term voluntary compliance (Hawkins, 1984; 
Black, 2001). The overarching aim of the ATO Compliance Model, therefore, was to 
create an environment that promoted compliance and provided a situation where long-term 
voluntary compliance and the systemic integrity of the tax system could be achieved. 
 
As can be seen from the following section, communication with taxpayers plays a 
significant role in the ATO Compliance Model. Through adoption of the model, the Tax 
Office has acknowledged that they must communicate with taxpayers that they will be 
cooperative first. If there is no taxpayer cooperation in return the Tax Office will then 
communicate that it has the power and has the potential to use a range of punishments if 
compliance is not forthcoming. Hence, because of its hierarchical approach to compliance 
management, the ATO Compliance Model suggests that instead of the former routine of 
applying enforcement strategies and penalties, that enforcement should begin primarily 
through understanding, education and service delivery and progress to stronger methods 
(for example, audits or penalties) if and when resistance to compliance obligations is met. 
 
The ATO Compliance Model 
 
The ATO Compliance Model is depicted graphically in Figure 3 below. The work of Ian 
Ayres and John Braithwaite (1992) on strategies of regulation, and the work of Valerie 
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Braithwaite (1995; see also Braithwaite et al., 1994) on motivational postures, strongly 
influenced the design of the model.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The ATO Compliance Model (source: Cash Economy Task Force Report, 
1998). 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, there are three parts to the ATO Compliance Model: 
(a) understanding the whole of the environment in which the regulatory act occurs at the 
far left of the model (that is, the BISEP factors), (b) the attitude of the taxpayer to their 
taxation obligations on the left hand side of the pyramid, and (c) the range of available 
regulatory strategies on the right hand side of the pyramid. There is also an additional part 
to the Model that cannot be depicted graphically. This part involves matching the 
taxpayer’s attitude to compliance to the appropriate enforcement strategy that should be 
used by the regulator (that is, how to manage the compliance).  
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The BISEP component of the model (that is, Business, Industry, Social, Economic and 
Psychological factors) enables the Tax Office to understand the environment in which the 
regulatory act occurs. It allows the Tax Office to understand why a person may or may not 
be complying and it highlights that many different factors may be impacting upon their 
attitudes (such as trust or ethnic background). Hence, the first step in applying the 
Compliance Model is to determine which factors influence a taxpayer’s attitude to 
compliance.  
 
The concepts presented on the left side of the pyramid were initially developed in the 
1990s by Dr Valerie Braithwaite as part of her research into the Australian nursing home 
industry. The left side of the pyramid looks at different attitudes and behaviours of the 
taxpayer (that is, their motivational postures). A good understanding of a taxpayer’s BISEP 
factors allows the regulator to understand why a person has a certain attitude towards 
paying tax. As can be seen in Figure 3, there are four attitudes to compliance (for a fifth 
attitude, gameplaying, see below) that a taxpayer could adopt: commitment, capture, 
resistance, and disengagement. These postures represent the ways in which an individual 
could position themselves in relation to a regulatory authority, and they are predispositions 
to compliant or non-compliant conduct (Braithwaite, 1995). Taxpayers who adopt a 
committed or captured posture are generally compliant, while those who are resistant or 
disengaged are generally more likely to be non-compliant (Braithwaite, 2003). One very 
important aspect to understand about the left side of the enforcement pyramid, however, is 
that attitudes and behaviours can change; they are dynamic not static. A taxpayers’ posture 
towards the Tax Office and paying tax can change on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. 
They can change in relation to different topics and they can change in response to the 
person they are dealing with. 
 
The attitude of commitment represents taxpayers who are ready, willing, and able to 
comply with their tax obligations. They are committed to meeting their obligations and 
they consider there is a moral or ethical obligation to comply with the law. They usually 
regulate their own compliance. It has been found that approximately 92% of the Australian 
taxpaying population endorses a committed posture towards the tax system (Braithwaite, 
2003). The second attitude of capture represents those taxpayers who may not be happy 
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with the Tax Office or tax system, but they acknowledge that paying tax is a part of life 
and accept their role as taxpayers. Further, captured taxpayers often require additional 
assistance in meeting their obligations as they may not have the skills or knowledge to get 
things right (73% of Australian taxpayers have been found to endorse a captured posture; 
Braithwaite, 2003). Most people say they want to meet their tax obligations because they 
want to, or because they have to. It is obviously in the interests of the tax regulator to 
ensure that most taxpayers remain committed, or at least captured by the system. The 73% 
of captured taxpayers need to interact with a fair and respectful tax system that treats them 
with integrity. These results also indicate that almost all Australian taxpayers will respond 
positively to cooperative and respectful treatment from the tax regulator.  
 
The attitude of resistance represents those taxpayers who actively resist the self-regulatory 
system. They are likely to view the Tax Office with antagonism because they feel the Tax 
Office is actively pursuing people to ‘catch them out’ rather than to help them, and they are 
likely to believe that people should take a stand against the Tax Office. Here, this may 
involve trying to avoid meeting their compliance obligations. Fifty-five per cent of 
taxpayers were found to endorse a posture of resistance (Braithwaite, 2003). This means 
that they have concerns about the system and will avoid their obligations if given an 
opportunity to do so. Stronger sanctions need to be emphasised with this group if they 
reject initial respectful and cooperative overtures by the tax regulator. This group might 
participate in the cash economy as an act of political defiance if they have the opportunity 
to do so. They may also engage in other acts of creative compliance (McBarnet, 2003; 
McBarnet & Whelan, 1999), such as underestimating income or overstating deductions 
because they have concerns about the integrity of the system. They therefore need to 
understand the increased risks and costs of their potential forays into non-compliant 
territory. 
 
The fourth attitude of disengagement represents those taxpayers who do not care that they 
are not doing the right thing by the Tax Office and they believe the Tax Office cannot do 
anything to them if they choose not to pay their taxes. In other words, these taxpayers no 
longer want to participate in the system (about 7% of taxpayers report being disengaged 
from the system; Braithwaite, 2003). Disengaged taxpayers still deserve a respectful and 
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cooperative first step. However, their responses to the regulator, and probably their history, 
will indicate a very rapid escalation to the top of an enforcement pyramid. The worst cases 
of disengagement are not usually regulated by a single agency in Australia. These hardcore 
transgressors generally require the cooperation of multiple regulatory agencies to join 
forces to incapacitate them (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  
 
In her book Taxing Democracy, Valerie Braithwaite (2003) describes what she sees as a 
fifth attitude to compliance in the area of tax. Although not physically depicted on the 
ATO Compliance Model, this fifth attitude represents taxpayers who are game-players. 
These taxpayers enjoy the game of finding the grey areas of tax law and the challenge of 
minimising their tax (about 13% of taxpayers). They do not necessarily think they are 
doing the wrong thing by the Tax Office, and they often believe they are fulfilling their 
obligations under the law (Murphy, 2003a, 2003b; Murphy & Byng, 2002a). This group of 
taxpayer are unique as they can sit anywhere along the left side of the compliance pyramid. 
Regulatory strategies for this newly identified group require further research. 
 
It is indeed possible for these postures to be held simultaneously, depending on the context 
(thus, the explanation for the overlap in taxpayers endorsing a particular posture; 92% 
committed, 73% captured, 55% resistant, 7% disengaged, 13% game-players). For 
example, a taxpayer may be genuinely committed to the tax system while at the same time 
being resistant to it. Those who resist most vocally, who challenge Tax Office decisions 
and who are openly critical of the institution, are not necessarily more non-compliant as a 
group than taxpayers who choose other ways of engaging with the system. Instead, they 
might just be exercising their democratic right to protest against a particular decision or 
rule they feel to be unjust. In such a situation, resisters may be able to provide valuable 
feedback for tax administrations about the operations of their tax system (for a more 
detailed discussion of this see Braithwaite, 2003). These factors therefore need to be 
considered when deciding upon an appropriate enforcement strategy. 
 
The right hand side of the ATO Compliance Model represents the different strategies of 
regulation that can be used when dealing with taxpayers. The concepts presented here were 
inspired by the work of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). At the base of the pyramid, the 
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activities are persuasive and focused on self-regulation. In other words, responsibility is 
given to the taxpayer to regulate their personal tax compliance behaviour. For self-
regulation to occur, the tax authority needs to make things simple for the taxpayer (for 
example, educate them, make information easily accessible). According to the Tax Office, 
its preferred approach is to develop and apply strategies that encourage self-regulation, or 
voluntary compliance, emphasising cooperation and the building of relationships. At the 
next level, sanctions increase and self-regulation may need to be enforced. Here, taxpayers 
may need assistance to comply. Strategies the Tax Office can use to gain compliance here 
would include sending out reminder letters, conducting real time reviews, or providing 
information. Small fines could be required to persuade people to comply. 
 
Further up the right hand side of the pyramid, the style of engagement becomes 
progressively more punitive and has more of a command and control quality. At the 
command regulation with discretion level, the Tax Office would advise taxpayers of top-
end sanctions they may face if they continue to resist the Tax Office’s attempts at 
encouraging compliance. Strategies that may be used here would be to conduct audits, to 
impose penalties, or to initiate enforceable undertakings1. At this level of enforcement, 
there would still be discretion in the actions that the Tax Office undertook against a 
taxpayer.  
 
Finally, the command regulation with no discretion level is where strong enforcement 
action, usually involving the courts, would be the only option left to the tax authority. 
Examples here could include large fines or prosecuting taxpayers in the courts for 
continued non-compliance. In extreme cases, forms of incapacitation such as deregistration 
or bankruptcy are considered. 
 
The arrows in the Compliance Model represent the desirability of the Tax Office to apply 
strategies that encourage a downward movement of taxpayers from resistance to the 
preferred level of self-regulation (Cash Economy Task Force Report, 1998). The beauty of 
                                                 
1 An enforceable undertaking is an undertaking given to a regulator that is enforceable in a court. They are 
generally accepted by the regulator as an alternative to civil or administrative action where there has been a 
contravention of the legislation they administer. 
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the model, however, is that it also allows the Tax Office to move to stronger enforcement 
methods if and when resistance is met. The added advantage of an enforcement pyramid 
such as this is that sanctioning options can be tailored to a particular industry or individual 
(to see how the ATO Compliance Model has been tailored for the purposes of enforcing 
tax compliance among large businesses see J. Braithwaite, 2003).  
 
When the Tax Office commences a regulatory conversation, their understanding of the 
taxpayers’ environment and attitude to compliance leads to a dialogue on the appropriate 
mix of persuasion and sanctions required to maintain an acceptable state of compliance 
(Black, 2002). When required, a sticks and carrots approach that allows for ‘a short period 
of ‘stick’ followed by a longer ‘carrot’ period of reintegration’ can be initiated to manage 
the compliance of a taxpayer (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 43). If successful this 
managed position will cause a behavioural change and improved attitudes towards future 
compliance. 
 
Stories of success with the ATO Compliance Model 
 
Has the ATO Compliance Model been successful and has it been a good policy decision to 
introduce a model of responsive regulation into such a large regulatory organisation? Two 
and a half years after the Compliance Model was introduced into the Tax Office’s 
everyday compliance strategies, researchers from the Centre for Tax System Integrity at 
The Australian National University (ANU) conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 
25 senior tax officers from within the Tax Office. The main objectives of the interviews 
were to gain information about how the Compliance Model was being accepted into the 
organisation, and to gain information about some of the success stories that the Tax Office 
had achieved when using the Compliance Model (Hobson, 2003). While a formal 
evaluation of the Model’s effectiveness has still to be conducted, anecdotal evidence from 
these interviews indicate that the Model has proved to be successful in affecting taxpayer 
attitudes and behaviour. This section documents just a few of the success stories that were 
raised in the interviews.  
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Case Study 1: Small family operated business 
 
‘This husband and wife business in Brisbane had quite a significant tax debt and the 
field officer went out, had a look at their records and realised that they were just not 
conducting themselves in the correct manner – not in a business like manner. Their 
records were a bit dishevelled. It seemed that they had not claimed tax deductions 
that they were entitled to, partly because they hadn’t assembled their records in an 
orderly fashion. Then it was a situation where they had quite a bit of work but they 
weren’t getting paid. They didn’t have a system of collecting their debts. And so it 
was a situation where this couple were bordering on bankruptcy. In fact, that would 
have been the next step by the Tax Office—put them out of business. Instead, we 
worked through their situation, realised that, in fact, [they] were entitled to some tax 
deductions they hadn’t claimed. And so we were able to reduce the bill quite 
significantly. And for the balance of the bill we negotiated an arrangement where 
they paid by instalments. And then, after a period of about 12 months or so, they 
had satisfied their tax debt and they’re [now] operating quite profitably and quite 
happily. If we’d gone in with the old approach, it would have been just simply to 
issue the summons, go to bankruptcy, put these people out of business. But instead, 
we looked at the reasons behind the debt and behind the situation that they were in. 
[The field officer] went out there not from the point of view of collecting the money 
and finalising the case, which is the traditional approach, but with a view to 
providing some assistance to see how we could resolve this issue.’ 
 
Case Study 2: Building and construction industry 
 
‘We visited businesses and talked to them and we were just there, doing some 
examinations of their current records and things like giving them advice, and where 
there was a problem we gave them the opportunity to fix the problem and we 
revisited in three months. And that had sort of never been done before. We then 
looked at all the people we visited, before they lodged their return, and just saw 
what their return did from last year to this year, to see if there was any increase in 
income declared. And you know, it showed that there was. The people we had 
visited, their income actually went up more than the industry average, and more 
than they put in last year, and things like that. So there seemed to be some power in 
the visit approach rather than auditing.’ 
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Case Study 3: Restaurant and café industry 
 
‘I sat down with a group of executives in the industry association to basically find 
out what the reasons behind non-compliance were, with the BISEP exploration. I 
found out that one of the reasons was that they don’t really know their obligations 
and how to fulfil their obligations. So as a result of that conversation, understanding 
the drivers for non-compliance [and] in many cases not knowing how to fulfil their 
record keeping requirement, we came around and developed a booklet specifically 
written for the restaurant industry, showing them how to keep their records. Now, 
having done that, and then understanding it, and understanding the BISEP and 
coming up with products that were to address those concerns of the industry, we 
have heard back from both the industry as well as the accounting and tax agent 
groups, who say it’s really been helping the taxpayer in that particular industry to 
comply.’ 
 
Case Study 4: Filing behaviour 
 
‘There was a project that was run where the letters that were sent to taxpayers, 
instead of saying, ‘You haven’t lodged your return this year, where is it? Get it in 
by this date or you’re in trouble’, they said along the lines of, ‘Well, we’ve noticed 
that you normally lodge your return on time, but we haven’t got yours this year, 
what’s happened to it?’ That seems like a fairly subtle change in approach, but it 
was actually very surprising the extent to which that change, the response to the 
letters. Not only did we get better lodgment outcomes, when people rang up they 
were nice. They didn’t ring up and abuse you for sending them a nasty letter, they 
rang up and they were nice, and they said, ‘Thanks for the letter, and you know, my 
return will be in by this time’. That’s just a small example, but that approach in 
lodgment is far broader now and it’s embedded in their practices.’ 
 
These case studies provide just some examples that were raised by senior managers within 
the Tax Office in their interviews with ANU researchers. They show that the principles 
underlying responsive regulation can be introduced and implemented effectively into a 
large regulatory organisation such as the Tax Office, and they show that the move away 
from a regulatory approach that relies on threat and legal coercion can still be effective in 
gaining voluntary compliance.  
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Conclusion 
 
The ATO Compliance Model has now been in operation within the Tax Office since 1998. 
The present paper has provided both an overview of the principles and concepts underlying 
the model, has provided a detailed description of how the model was constructed by the 
Tax Office for use in the area of taxation administration, and has discussed a number of 
success stories that have been achieved as a result of the Model’s use. While it is unclear at 
this stage whether the Tax Office has had overwhelming success with the Model in 
bringing about long-term compliance among those they regulate, the case studies discussed 
above, along with findings presented in other papers (Hobson, 2003; Job & Honaker, 2003; 
Shover et al., 2003), appear to be encouraging. From these reports, therefore, it appears 
that the Tax Office has made a good policy decision by introducing a style of regulation 
that is responsive to the needs of both taxpayers and tax officials. As one Tax Office 
executive said in his interview, ‘I just think that it’s a good tool for us to use really’. 
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Appendix 
 
Throughout the 1990s tens of thousands of Australian taxpayers ‘invested’ in mass-
marketed tax effective schemes. Their investments provided them with combined tax 
deductions exceeding four billion Australian dollars. The Tax Office maintained that 
investments in these arrangements were largely funded through tax deductions and little 
private capital was at risk. The Tax Office therefore came to the conclusion in 1998 that 
taxpayers who invested in these schemes did so for the ‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining a 
tax benefit, and, as a result, the anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the Australian 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applied. The Tax Office moved to disallow scheme 
related tax deductions claimed up to six years earlier and issued amended assessments to 
approximately 42 000 investors. Scheme investors were told that they had to immediately 
pay back taxes with interest and appropriate penalties (that is, within two weeks) or they 
would run the risk of facing the full extent of the law. 
 
The majority of investors, however, claimed that the schemes they invested in had been 
sold to them, in many cases by their accountants or financial planners, as a way of legally 
minimising tax. Many investors believed that they had done nothing wrong by investing in 
these schemes and resented being penalised and thought of as ‘tax cheats’. The majority 
therefore actively resisted the Tax Office’s demands that they pay back tax. Some four 
years after amended assessments had first been issued more than 50% of scheme investors 
had still refused to enter into settlement arrangements with the Tax Office to pay back their 
taxes. Further, a number of fighting funds and lobbying groups were set up to represent 
scheme investors’ interests. These fighting funds offered investors the opportunity to fight 
the Tax Office’s view of the law in court (for more on this case study see Murphy, in press, 
2002, 2003a, 2003b; Murphy & Byng, 2002a, 2002b). 
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